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INTRODUCTION
This is an initial brief filed by the intervenor-appellee-crossappellant, the State of New Union, in response to the order of this
court dated September 29, 2010. References to the problem are
abbreviated as follows: ―R.‖ = Problem. References to the
documents cited in the Summary of the Record are abbreviated as
follows: ―Rec. doc.‖ = Record Document.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Subject-matter jurisdiction is a contested issue in this case.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Twelfth Circuit has
jurisdiction to hear appeals from any final decision of the United
States District Court for the District of New Union, including
decisions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1291
(2006).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS
Pursuant to its statutory mandate under the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act (―RCRA‖), the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (―EPA‖) approved the State of
New Union‘s hazardous waste program in lieu of a federal
program in 1986. (Rec. doc. 2, p. 1). EPA made this determination
after finding New Union possessed adequate resources to fully
administer and enforce the program. Id.
Recently, state budget constraints have resulted in
alterations to New Union‘s program. In response to these
changes, the New Union Department of Environmental
Protection (―DEP‖) has sought to administer the program more
efficiently. Among other things, the New Union DEP asked EPA
to work in tandem with its regulators to maintain the quality of
the New Union program. (Rec. doc. 5 for 2009, p. 23). Moreover,
the New Union legislature transferred some state environmental
regulatory authority to the New Union Railroad Commission.
(Rec. doc. 5 for 2000, pp. 103-105). Finally, the New Union
legislature passed a law focusing the efforts of the state
hazardous waste program on Pollutant X, one of the most potent
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and toxic chemicals to human health. (Rec. doc. 5 for 2000, pp.
105–07).
On January 5, 2009, the Citizens for Regulation and the
Environment, Inc. (―CARE‖) served a petition on the
Administrator of the EPA. (R. at 4). The petition requested that
EPA commence proceedings to withdraw its approval of New
Union‘s hazardous waste program. Id. EPA has not yet acted on
this petition. Id.
Dissatisfied with EPA‘s delay, CARE filed suit in the U.S.
District Court for the District of New Union on January 4, 2010.
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 6972, CARE sought either an injunction
requiring EPA to act on the petition, or judicial review of EPA‘s
―constructive denial‖ of the petition and ―constructive
determination‖ that the program met RCRA‘s requirements. The
State of New Union filed an unopposed motion to intervene,
which the district court granted.
At the same time it filed the above action in the district
court, CARE filed a petition for review with the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Twelfth Circuit. CARE sought judicial review of
EPA‘ s ―constructive denial‖ and ―constructive determination‖ on
the same grounds. New Union filed an unopposed motion to
intervene in that case as well. This court granted the motion and
stayed resolution of the claim pending the outcome of the district
court action.
In an order dated June 2, 2010, the district court, responding
to the parties‘ cross-motions for summary judgment, denied
CARE‘s motion for summary judgment and granted New Union‘s
motion for summary judgment. (R. at 9). Each of the parties
subsequently filed notices of appeal with this court. (R. at 1). In
addition, CARE now asks this court to lift its earlier stay and
consolidate the two actions. (R. at 1–2).
On September 29, 2010, this Court ordered all parties to brief
seven issues. (R. at 3). This timely response on behalf of the
State of New Union follows.
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
Whether RCRA § 7002(a)(2) provides jurisdiction for district
courts to order EPA to act on CARE‘s petition for revocation of
EPA‘s approval of New Union‘s hazardous waste program, filed
pursuant to RCRA § 7004.
Whether 28 U.S.C. § 1331 provides jurisdiction for district
courts to order EPA to act on CARE‘s petition for revocation of
EPA‘s approval of New Union‘s hazardous waste program, filed
under 5 U.S.C. § 553(e).
Whether EPA‘s failure to act on CARE‘s petition that EPA
initiate proceedings to consider withdrawing approval of New
Union‘s hazardous waste program under RCRA § 3006(e)
constituted a constructive denial of that petition and a
constructive determination that New Union‘s program continued
to meet criteria for program approval under RCRA § 3006(b), both
subject to judicial review under RCRA §§ 7002(a)(2) and 7006(b).
Whether, assuming the answer to issue III is positive and the
answer to either or both of issues I and II is positive, this court
should lift the stay in C.A. No. 18-2010 and proceed with judicial
review of EPA‘s constructive actions or should the court remand
the case to the lower court to order EPA to initiate and complete
proceedings to consider withdrawal of its approval of New Union‘s
hazardous waste program.
Whether, assuming this court proceeds to the merits of
CARE‘s challenge, EPA must withdraw its approval of New
Union‘s program because its resources and performance fail to
meet RCRA‘s approval criteria.
Whether, assuming this court proceeds to the merits of
CARE‘s challenge, EPA must withdraw its approval of New
Union‘s program because the New Union 2000 Environmental
Regulatory Adjustment Act effectively withdraws railroad
hazardous waste facilities from regulation.
Whether, assuming this court proceeds to the merits of
CARE‘s challenge, EPA must withdraw its approval of New
Union‘s program because the New Union 2000 Environmental
Regulatory Adjustment Act renders New Union‘s program not
equivalent to the federal RCRA program, inconsistent with the
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federal program and other approved state programs, or in
violation of the Commerce Clause.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Twelfth Circuit Court of Appeals reviews a district
court‘s dismissal of a case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
de novo. Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252, 1260 (11th
Cir.2009). If this court consolidates this action, this court reviews
a district court‘s grant of summary judgment de novo. Haynes v.
Williams, 392 F.3d 478, 484 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
RCRA‘s citizen suit provision allows any person to bring an
action against the EPA Administrator where there is alleged a
failure of the Administrator to perform any act or duty which is
not discretionary. RCRA requires the EPA Administrator to take
action after a person petitions the Administrator for the
promulgation, amendment, or repeal of any regulation. RCRA
does not require the Administrator to take action after a person
petitions the administrator for the promulgation, amendment, or
repeal of any order. Such action is discretionary.
CARE argues its petition requesting that EPA commence
proceedings to withdraw its approval of New Union‘s hazardous
waste program falls under a nondiscretionary provision of RCRA.
However, program approvals are orders, rather than
rulemakings, under RCRA. Therefore, because the Administrator
has discretion to act on petitions dealing with orders, RCRA‘s
citizen suit provision does not provide a jurisdictional basis for a
district court to order EPA to act on CARE‘s petition.
Furthermore, EPA‘s failure to respond to CARE‘s petition is
not a ―constructive denial‖ of the petition or a ―constructive
determination‖ that New Union‘s program is in compliance.
RCRA lacks time-specific statutory deadlines for EPA‘s response.
Rather, Congress granted EPA the discretion to address petitions
as the agency sees fit, and to conserve its limited resources.
Where there is no time-specific duty to respond, a 364-day delay
cannot be construed as a constructive denial of a petition or a
constructive determination of compliance. The decision to initiate
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withdrawal proceedings is, under RCRA, discretionary with EPA.
Discretionary statutes such as RCRA give agencies the flexibility
to respond within a ―reasonable‖ time, a term that has been
interpreted to equate to several years or even decades. EPA‘s
delay of just under a year is not such an unreasonable inaction or
delay. When EPA has not yet made such a determination or
denial, there is no basis for the district court‘s review.
Even if this court disagrees and finds that EPA‘s delay is a
―constructive‖ denial of CARE‘s petition, the court should remand
the issue to EPA for initiation and exhaustion of the statutory
administrative remedies. New Union has a right under RCRA to
notice, a fair hearing, a compiled agency record, and an
opportunity to comply with RCRA‘s framework. RCRA‘s own
regulatory scheme and the basic demands of due process demand
that this court refrain from initiating a substantive review of the
New Union RCRA program.
If this court nevertheless decides to overturn the decision of
the district court and proceed to the merits of CARE‘s challenge,
EPA should not be forced to withdraw its approval of the New
Union RCRA program. The withdrawal of a state program‘s
approval is an extreme and drastic remedy that requires EPA to
fill the gap left by the withdrawn state program, and that
undermines the letter and spirit of cooperative federalism
embodied by RCRA.
This is particularly true when New Union‘s program is
substantially in compliance with RCRA. New Union‘s program
has not failed to issue permits, inspect facilities, or otherwise
exercise its control over hazardous waste management as
required by RCRA. New Union, in partnership with EPA, has
demonstrated the ability to enforce its RCRA program via civil
suits and other remedies. There is no ―failure‖ in regulation or
enforcement that would constitute a ―failure‖ of the New Union
program or subject it to withdrawal.
CARE next challenges the New Union program on the basis
of the 2000 Amendments to the Railroad Regulatory Act.
However, CARE misunderstands the role of the federal
authorities in RCRA‘s federal-state partnership scheme. These
amendments do not create a regulatory gap that would subject
the New Union program to withdrawal—enforcement authority is
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simply moved to another state body, with EPA retaining civil
enforcement authority in case the Railroad Commission fails to
adequately enforce the environmental law. Federal authorities
are also empowered to enforce state permit requirements and
bring criminal charges under RCRA, thus filling any potential
gap created by the RRA Amendments. There is no basis for
withdrawal.
Finally, New Union‘s regulation of Pollutant X is exactly the
sort of permissible more-stringent regulation, based in
considerations of human health and environmental protection,
that states are allowed under RCRA. EPA is not required to
withdraw its approval. The regulation of Pollutant X does not ban
the movement of hazardous waste across New Union‘s border,
and does not constitute a ―prohibition‖ on the treatment, storage,
or disposal of hazardous waste. The regulation is not facially
discriminatory, and does not violate the dormant Commerce
Clause under the Supreme Court‘s balancing test for legislation
based on permissible concerns. CARE‘s petition should be denied
and the New Union RCRA program should be upheld.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT
RCRA SECTION 7002 DOES NOT PROVIDE A
JURISDICTIONAL BASIS FOR A DISTRICT
COURT TO ORDER EPA TO ACT ON CARE’S
PETITION, FILED UNDER RCRA SECTION 7004,
FOR REVOCATION OF EPA’S APPROVAL OF
NEW UNION’S HAZARDOUS WASTE PROGRAM.

The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (―RCRA‖)
provides a comprehensive federal program for the management of
hazardous waste from ―cradle to grave.‖ However, RCRA allows
states to establish their own hazardous waste programs, in lieu of
the federal program, after obtaining EPA‘s approval. See 42
U.S.C. § 6926(b). Indeed, the statute makes clear that states, like
New Union, are the preferred authorities for implementation and
enforcement of the federal program. Id.
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In order to ensure compliance, RCRA‘s citizen suit provision
allows any person to bring an action ―against the Administrator
where there is alleged a failure of the Administrator to perform
any act or duty under this chapter which is not discretionary with
the Administrator.‖ 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(2). However, contrary to
CARE‘s claims, this section does not provide the district court a
jurisdictional basis to order EPA to act on its petition to withdraw
approval from New Union‘s program. Rather, EPA has discretion
to decide whether to act. The decision of the District Court to
dismiss for lack of jurisdiction was correct, and should be upheld.
A. CARE’s petition was not properly submitted under
RCRA Section 7004 because withdrawal of a state
program’s approval is an order, not a rule.
On January 5, 2009, CARE filed its petition with the EPA
pursuant to RCRA Section 7004 to force EPA to begin proceedings
to withdraw New Union‘s program approval. (R. at 4). Section
7004 provides, ―[a]ny person may petition the Administrator for
the promulgation, amendment, or repeal of any regulation . . .
.Within a reasonable time following receipt of such petition, the
Administrator shall take action with respect to such petition.‖ 42
U.S.C. § 6974.
However, RCRA does not define ―regulation‖ as used in
Section 7004.
Therefore, this court should look to the
Administrative Procedure Act (―APA‖) for guidance. See, e.g.,
Watts v. SEC, 482 F.3d 501, 505 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (looking to APA
definitions to interpret term used in federal securities laws).
The APA provides definitions of agency substantive ―rules‖
and ―orders‖ as used in the APA. Section 551(4) defines ―rule‖ as:
the whole or a part of an agency statement of general or
particular applicability and future effect designed to implement,
interpret, or prescribe law or policy or describing the
organization, procedure, or practice requirements of an agency
and includes the approval or prescription for the future of rates,
wages, corporate or financial structures or reorganizations
thereof, prices, facilities, appliances, services or allowances
therefore or of valuations, costs, or accounting, or practices
bearing on any of the foregoing[.]
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―Rulemaking‖ is defined in section 551(5) as ―agency process
for formulating, amending, or repealing a rule[.]‖
―Order‖ is defined in section 551(6) as ―the whole or a part of
a final disposition, whether affirmative, negative, injunctive, or
declaratory in form, of an agency in a matter other than rule
making but including licensing[.]‖ (emphasis added).
―License‖ is defined in section 551(8) as ―the whole or a part
of an agency permit, certificate, approval, registration, charter,
membership, statutory exemption or other form of permission.‖
―Licensing‖ is defined in section 551(9) as ―agency process
respecting the grant, renewal, denial, revocation, suspension,
annulment, withdrawal, limitation, amendment, modification, or
conditioning of a license.‖
EPA argues the APA definitions of ―rule‖ or ―rulemaking‖
apply to the RCRA permit approval process. Because ―[c]ourts
and Congress treat the terms ―regulation‖ and ―rule‖ as
interchangeable and synonymous,‖ EPA would have this court
apply the definition of ―rule‖ in 551(4) or ―rulemaking‖ in 551(5).
Nat’l Treas. Emps. Union v. Weise, 100 F.3d 157, 160 (D.C. Cir.
1996). However, ―[w]here there is no clear intention otherwise, a
specific statute will not be controlled or nullified by a general
one.‖ Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 550–51 (1974). Here, the
APA definitions of ―order‖ and ―license‖ more closely resemble the
RCRA permitting process than the definitions of ―rule‖ or
―rulemaking.‖
In approving the New Union program, EPA was issuing a
―permit.‖ See 42 U.S.C. § 6925. Under 551(8), a permit is a form
of ―license.‖ According to 551(9), an agency issues a ―license‖
after conducting a ―licensing.‖ A ―licensing,‖ under 551(6) is an
―order.‖ Therefore, because an ―order‖ is ―a matter other than
rulemaking,‖ the RCRA permitting process cannot be a
―rulemaking‖ and CARE‘s petition was not submitted under 42
U.S.C. § 6974. See 5 U.S.C. § 551(4).
There is an additional reason for this court to reject EPA‘s
interpretation of the APA. Because Congress did not direct the
EPA to implement the APA, EPA‘s interpretation is not entitled
to Chevron deference. See Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U.S.
638 (1990) (a precondition to Chevron deference is a congressional
delegation of administrative authority). In addition, ―ambiguities
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in the APA are not properly viewed as congressional delegations
to the administrative agencies, since the very purpose of the APA
is to constrain these agencies.‖ Air North Am. v. Dep’t of Transp.,
937 F.2d 1427, 1436–37 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing Wong Yang Sung
v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33 (1950)). As such, this court is not bound
to accept EPA‘s strained interpretation of ―rule‖ and
―rulemaking.‖
When interpreting ambiguous procedural terms in a statute
an agency is authorized to administer, some courts of appeals
have not stopped with the APA definitions. See, e.g., New Mexico
Envtl. Imp. Div. v. Thomas, 789 F.2d 825, 829 (10th Cir. 1986).
They have also looked to ―the character of a proceeding to
determine whether it is a rule or an order.‖ Id.
Here, as the district court rightly noted, ―[EPA‘s] action has
the characteristics of an order. EPA is applying facts to law;
determining whether the program submitted by New Union met
the criteria of RCRA and EPA‘s regulations under RCRA.‖ (R. 6).
Two Supreme Court cases elaborate on the distinction
between a ―rule‖ and an ―order,‖ Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S.
373 (1908) and Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization,
239 U.S. 441 (1915).
The Londoner/Bi-Metallic doctrine
generally holds that ―orders‖ are usually adjudicative in nature
and apply to a particular group, whereas ―rules‖ are more
legislative in nature and have general applicability. When EPA
approved New Union‘s program, it was acting in a way that
affected only the New Union program. EPA‘s approval did not
have any general applicability.
Therefore, because ―EPA‘s approval or disapproval of New
Union‘s program was an order rather than a rulemaking, it is not
subject to petition under section [6974]‖ and 42 U.S.C. § 6972
does not provide a jurisdictional basis for a district court to order
EPA to act on CARE‘s petition. (R. 7).
B. CARE may have had a cause of action under RCRA
Section 7006, however it is now time barred.
Because a program approval is an ―order‖ rather than a
―regulation,‖ CARE‘s petition could not have been filed under
Section 7004. 42 U.S.C. § 6974. Instead, RCRA Section 7006, the
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provision governing review of approvals of state programs,
applies. That section provides:
[r]eview of the Administrator‘s action (1) in issuing, denying,
modifying, or revoking any permit under section 6925 of this title
. . . may be had by any interested person in the Circuit Court of
Appeals of the United States for the Federal judicial district in
which such person resides or transacts such business upon
application by such person.

42 U.S.C. § 6976.
In addition to providing CARE the exclusive means by which
it could challenge the New Union permit, Section 7006 requires
that any petition for review be filed within ninety days. See 42
U.S.C. § 6976(b) (―[a]ny such application shall be made within
ninety days from the date of such issuance, denial, modification,
revocation, grant, or withdrawal, or after such date only if such
application is based solely on grounds which arose after such
ninetieth day.‖).
Because ―the facts CARE alleges in support of its argument
that New Union‘s program no longer meets the approval criteria
occurred more than ninety days ago,‖ CARE‘s potential cause of
action under RCRA Section 7006(b) is time barred. (R. at 7).
II. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT
THERE IS NO FEDERAL QUESTION
JURISDICTION FOR A DISTRICT COURT TO
ORDER EPA TO ACT ON A PETITION FOR
REVOCATION OF EPA’S APPROVAL OF NEW
UNION’S HAZARDOUS WASTE PROGRAM.
CARE alternatively argues 28 U.S.C. § 1331 provides
jurisdiction for a district court to order EPA to act on its petition.
However, ―[s]ection 1331 does not independently or separately
confer jurisdiction. Rather, the plaintiffs must identify a statute
or law of the United States on which their claims are based.‖ Gem
Cnty. Mosquito Abatement Dist. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 398 F.
Supp. 2d 1, 12 (D.D.C. 2005). Here, CARE asserts 5 U.S.C. §
553(e) provides this basis. However, this section is inapplicable to
CARE‘s petition.
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Section 553(e) states ―[e]ach agency shall give an interested
person the right to petition for the issuance, amendment, or
repeal of a rule.‖ But as found by the District Court and
discussed in the analysis above, CARE petitioned EPA to
reconsider an order, not a rule. Because CARE is challenging an
order rather than a rule, section 553(e) does not apply and cannot
give CARE a basis for its claim. Absent this independent
statutory basis, there is no federal question jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1331.
Furthermore, judicial review under the APA is limited to
either review specifically authorized in a substantive statute, or
―final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy
in a court.‖ 5 U.S.C. § 704. The ―form of proceeding for judicial
review is the special statutory review proceeding relevant to the
subject matter in a court specified by statute or, in the absence or
inadequacy thereof, any applicable form of legal action. . . .‖ 5
U.S.C. § 703.
Here, RCRA itself mandates a special statutory review
procedure for precisely the type of claim CARE raised. See 42
U.S.C. § 6976. Because CARE chose not to exercise its rights
under this section, its claim is now time barred. Rather than
affirm CARE‘s eleventh hour attempts to bring a cause of action,
this court should act in accordance with the plain language of
RCRA and uphold the district court‘s dismissal of CARE‘s claim
for lack of jurisdiction.
III. THERE HAS BEEN NEITHER A CONSTRUCTIVE
DENIAL OF CARE’S PETITION NOR A
CONSTRUCTIVE DETERMINATION OF NEW
UNION’S COMPLIANCE FOR THIS COURT TO
REVIEW
CARE erroneously contends that EPA‘s failure to respond to
the petition to initiate withdrawal proceedings is a ―constructive
denial‖ of CARE‘s petition and a ―constructive determination‖
that New Union is in compliance with RCRA. Based upon this
string of inferences, CARE claims it is entitled to judicial review
under RCRA Section 7006. CARE‘s argument is without merit
because neither of the statutes CARE bases its petition on
provide time-specific deadlines for EPA to respond. Without a
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time-specific deadline mandated by RCRA or the APA, there is no
basis for this court to decide that a ―constructive‖ denial or
determination has been made. Moreover, EPA‘s inaction is not an
unreasonable agency delay.
A. RCRA Section 7004 and APA Section 553 do not
impose a time-specific deadline upon the EPA to
answer petitions, therefore there was no
“constructive denial” of CARE’s petition.
Even if this court decides CARE‘s petition was properly filed
as a challenge to a ―rule,‖ EPA‘s delay in responding to the
petition does not constitute a ―constructive denial‖ of the petition
that would be subject to judicial review under RCRA Section
7006.
RCRA section 7004 provides, ―[a]ny person may petition the
Administrator for the promulgation, amendment, or repeal of any
regulation . . . . [w]ithin a reasonable time following receipt of
such petition, the Administrator shall take action with respect to
such petition.‖ 42 U.S.C. § 6974 (emphasis added). Similarly,
APA section 553 provides, ―[e]ach agency shall give an interested
person the right to petition for the issuance, amendment, or
repeal of a rule.‖ 5 U.S.C. § 553(e) (emphasis added). However,
the statutory right to petition the Administrator does not grant a
statutory right to a response in a particular time frame. EPA‘s
silence for 364 days cannot trigger a deadline that does not exist,
and does not mean that the delay is a ―constructive denial.‖
Therefore, CARE‘s reliance on a ―constructive denial‖ theory is
unfounded. Cf. Scott v. City of Hammond, 741 F.2d 992 (7th Cir.
1984) (holding that prolonged silence and a ―refusal to act‖ by a
state may amount to the ―constructive submission‖ of a
regulatory change under the Clean Water Act, which then places
a duty upon the Administrator to approve or disapprove within
thirty days).
In Scott, it was the Clean Water Act‘s short statutory
deadlines that created the duty to respond and allowed the court
to characterize the state‘s prolonged silence as a refusal to act.
See id. While New Union concedes that under RCRA section
3006(e), ―[t]he administrator shall respond in writing to any
petition to commence withdrawal proceedings,‖ the Administrator
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is not under a duty to approve or disapprove CARE‘s petition in a
fixed amount of time absent short statutory deadlines.
―Mere inaction by [an agency] cannot be transmuted by
petitioners into an order rejecting their petition. Administrative
action is not reviewable as an order ‗unless and until [it]
impose[s] an obligation, den[ies] a right, or fix[es] some legal
relationship as a consummation of the administrative process.‘ ―
Am. Rivers v. FERC, 170 F.3d 896, 897 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting
Cities of Riverside & Colton v. FERC, 765 F.2d 1434, 1438 (9th
Cir. 1985)). The mere passage of time where there is no fixed time
to respond does not constitute a ―constructive denial‖ of CARE‘s
petition. See 40 C.F.R. § 271.23 (2010).
B. Since RCRA Section 3006 does not impose a timespecific deadline, there has been no “constructive
determination” that New Union is in compliance for
this Court to review.
RCRA section 3006(e), withdrawal of authorization, provides:
Whenever the Administrator determines after public hearing that
a State is not administering and enforcing a program authorized
under this section in accordance with requirements of this
section, he shall so notify the State and, if appropriate corrective
action is not taken within a reasonable time, not to exceed ninety
days, the Administrator shall withdraw authorization of such
program and establish a Federal program pursuant to this
subchapter.

42 U.S.C. §6926(e)(2010) (emphasis added). This section places
discretion with EPA to decide when to withdraw authorization of
a state‘s RCRA program, because Congress did not provide a
time-specific deadline. See Sierra Club v. Thomas, 828 F.2d 783,
791 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (―it is highly improbable that a deadline will
be nondiscretionary . . . if it exists only by reason of an inference
drawn from the overall statutory framework‖). But see Maine v.
Thomas, 874 F.2d 883, 888 (1st Cir. 1989) (adopting the D.C.
Circuit‘s rule that provisions that do include explicit deadlines
should create non-discretionary duties). Not only does the
Administrator have discretion regarding the appropriate
timeframe to respond to petitions, she also has the discretion to
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choose when to make a determination if a state is in compliance
or not. Since there was no time-specific deadline for the
Administrator to make this ―determination,‖ the ―constructive
determination‖ doctrine of Scott is inapplicable
Other cases arising under the Clean Water Act clarify why
EPA‘s inaction on CARE‘s petition does not constitute a
―constructive determination‖ that New Union is in compliance.
See Northwest Envtl. Advocates v. EPA, 268 F. Supp. 2d 1255,
1263 (D. Or. 2003). In Northwest Environmental Advocates, the
court held the Administrator had a duty to review a continued
implementation plan under the CWA and then make a
determination if a revised standard was necessary or not.
However, because the Administrator was given discretion to
choose when to promulgate revised standards under the statute,
a ―constructive submission‖ theory was inapplicable. Id.
Similarly, the discretion vested in the Administrator under RCRA
belies CARE‘s theory that inaction on a petition is a constructive
approval.
The enforcement regulations further emphasize the
discretion of the Administrator over program compliance
determinations under RCRA:
―[t]he administrator may order the commencement of withdrawal
proceedings on his or her own initiative or in response to a
petition from an interested person alleging failure of the State to
comply with the requirements of [section 6926]. . .‖

40 C.F.R. § 271.23. See Texas Disposal Sys. Landfill Inc. v. EPA,
No. 09-502704, 2010 WL 1838724, at *1 (5th Cir. 2010)
(withdrawal of authorization of a state‘s hazardous waste
program is committed to the discretion of the Administrator).
Further, ―judicial imposition of any deadline upon EPA for
construing a state‘s inaction as a ‗constructive submission‘ would
necessarily be premised only by inference from the deadlines in
the statute, and that even if such an inference were plausible, it
would be unwarranted as it would unduly limit EPA‘s flexibility
in addressing [] compliance.‖ Am. Canoe Ass’n, Inc. v. EPA, 30 F.
Supp. 2d 908, 920 (E.D. Va. 1998). New Union DEP‘s annual
reports coupled with EPA‘s inaction on CARE‘s petition are
insufficient to constitute a ―constructive determination‖ of
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compliance by the Administrator, and are therefore not
reviewable under RCRA Section 7006.
C. Judicial review is unnecessary because there has
not been an unreasonable agency delay.
Finally, there is no basis for judicial scrutiny of EPA‘s failure
to respond to CARE‘s petition when there has been no
unreasonable delay or other justification for this to force the
agency to act. ―[A] fundamental infirmity in an agency
proceeding, justifying interlocutory relief, may occur when an
agency unduly delays the resolution of a matter committed to it.‖
In re City of Virginia Beach, 42 F.3d 881, 885 (4th Cir. 1994)
(emphasis added) (citing Telecomm. Research & Action Ctr. v.
FCC, 750 F.2d 70 (D.C. Cir. 1984)). There is no such fundamental
infirmity in the agency proceeding here.
In City of Virginia Beach, the court determined that FERC‘s
environmental review was statutorily authorized. Therefore,
what was left unanswered was whether the agency delay was
egregious. The court stated, ―when action sought to be reviewed is
one that is committed to discretion, it cannot be said that a
litigant‘s right to a particular result is clear and indisputable and
relief by a writ of mandamus would ordinarily not be available.‖
Id.at 884 (quoting Allied Chem. Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S.
33, 36 (1980) (internal quotations omitted)). The Fourth Circuit
opined that ―we cannot conclude that the delays have been so
egregious as to meet the demanding standard required for us to
interfere with the agency process through a writ of mandamus‖
despite a delay of four and a half years. Id. at 886.
Similarly, in the state withdrawal proceedings at issue here,
the regulations require the Administrator to ―respond in writing
to any petition to commence withdrawal proceedings,‖ but the
time-frame is committed to discretion. For this sort of
discretionary action, a mere 364-day delay is not unreasonable.
See 40 C.F.R. § 271.23. The D.C. Circuit observed that courts
rarely compel an agency to make an immediate decision. ―Rather,
courts allow agencies to set their own priorities on account of
their ‗unique-and authoritative-position‘ to ‗allocate their
resources in the optimal way.‖ See Orion Reserves Ltd. P’ship v.
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Kempthorne, 516 F. Supp. 2d 8, 11 (D.D.C. 2007) (quoting In re
Barr Labs. Inc., 930 F.2d 72, 76 (D.C. Cir. 1991)).
Although a limit can be placed on the reasonableness of
agency action, EPA has not surpassed this limit. The D.C. Circuit
stated that there is no per se rule on how long is too long for
agency inaction. Further, reasonableness can be defined as a time
period encompassing months or occasionally a year or two, but
certainly not decades. In re Am. Rivers & Idaho Rivers United,
372 F.3d 413, 417 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (since agency did not offer
explanation for delay, six year delay on a mandatory agency
action to grant or deny a petition was unreasonable); MCI
Telecomms. Corp. v. FCC, 627 F.2d 322, 340 (D.C. Cir.1980).
Whereas here, the EPA‘s delay in responding to CARE‘s petition,
364-days, does not surpass the threshold of reasonableness and
does not demand judicial intervention.
IV. THE COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD NOT LIFT
THE STAY, AND INSTEAD SHOULD REMAND
THE CASE TO THE DISTRICT COURT TO ORDER
EPA TO INITIATE PROCEEDINGS
Even assuming this court has jurisdiction, and that inaction
by EPA can be seen as a ―constructive denial‖ of CARE‘s petition
or a ―constructive determination‖ that New Union is in
compliance, the case is not ripe for review in this court. One of
the main functions of the ripeness doctrine is to provide an
agency a ―full opportunity. . . to correct errors or modify positions
in the course of a proceeding.‖ Pub. Citizen Health Research
Group v. Comm’r, FDA, 740 F.2d 21, 31 (D.C. Cir. 1984). As the
Supreme Court stated:
The basic rationale is to prevent the courts, through avoidance of
premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract
disagreements over administrative policies, and also to protect
the agencies from judicial interference until an administrative
decision has been formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way
by the challenging parties. The problem is best seen in a twofold
aspect, requiring us to evaluate both the fitness of the issues for
judicial decision and the hardship to the parties of withholding
court consideration.
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Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148–49 (1967). The Court
should not intercede until EPA has had a chance to make formal
decision, using the complex regulatory process in place, and until
New Union has a chance to comply with any final order from the
EPA.
A. The question of New Union’s compliance with RCRA
is not subject to review in this Court because EPA’s
decision not to invoke its administrative process is
discretionary and not reviewable.
[A]n agency decision not to enforce often involves a complicated
balancing of a number of factors which are particularly within its
expertise. Thus, an agency must not only assess whether a
violation has occurred, but whether agency resources are best
spent on this violation or another, whether the agency is likely to
succeed if it acts, whether the particular enforcement action best
fits the agency‘s overall policies, and indeed, whether the agency
has enough resources to undertake the action at all.

Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031,1046–47 (D.C.
Cir. 1979).
Generally, an agency‘s decision not to bring an enforcement
action is presumptively unreviewable by a court. See Heckler v.
Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985). This presumption may be
rebutted only when the substantive statute at issue provides
guidelines for the court to follow ―in exercising its enforcement
powers‖ over the agency. Id.at 33.Since the substantive statute
and regulations lack time-specific guidance for the court, EPA‘s
delay is an unreviewable agency decision and does not become
reviewable until EPA has commenced its proceedings and New
Union has had a chance to come into compliance.
Similarly, under the APA, an agency‘s decision not to invoke
an enforcement mechanism provided by statute is not ordinarily
subject to judicial review. Id. (citing 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2)). See also
Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. at 832 (―[A]n agency‘s decision not to
take enforcement action should be presumed immune from
judicial review under 701(a)(2).‖). As in Texas Disposal, CARE
petitions EPA based on RCRA‘s withdrawal provisions. The case
law is again instructive. In Texas Disposal, a landfill company

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol1/iss1/6

18

06

Intervenor

4/24/2011 2:32 AM

178 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW ONLINE [Vol. 1
petitioned EPA to withdraw its authorization of Texas‘s federally
approved hazardous waste program. See Texas Disposal, 2010 WL
1838724, at *1. However, without cause to withdraw Texas‘s
RCRA program or to commence proceedings, ―EPA‘s
determination was a non-reviewable discretionary agency action.‖
Id.
Also, as the Fifth Circuit has correctly held, RCRA, with no
statutory deadline, does not present standards to guide the court.
Therefore the agency‘s non-enforcement action is not subject to
judicial review. Id. The only limit imposed upon the EPA here is
that it must commence withdrawal proceedings after it has
determined that a state is not in compliance. So therefore, even
assuming that this court did find that there was a ―constructive
determination‖ that New Union is in compliance with RCRA and
that such a ―determination‖ is presumptively reviewable, that
presumption is rebutted by lack of any substantive law to apply.
See Texas Disposal, 2010 WL 1838724, at *1; 40 C.F.R. §
271.23.There is no basis for this court to review EPA‘s nonenforcement decision.
B. This case is not entitled to judicial review until all
administrative remedies have been exhausted
under RCRA Section 3006 (e), and should be
remanded back to the agency.
Even assuming EPA‘s inaction was a ―constructive denial‖ of
CARE‘s petition and a ―constructive determination‖ that New
Union is in compliance, CARE would still not be entitled to
judicial review by this court until all administrative remedies
have been exhausted and until the court has a final agency action
to review. ―The final agency action, for purposes of judicial
review, occurs when the EPA issues its final decision, and all
administrative remedies [have been] exhausted.‖ 40 C.F.R. §
124.19(f)(1) (2010). New Union has not received a final decision
from EPA, and the administrative remedies to correct any
perceived deficiency in the program have not been exhausted.
In Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. SEC, suit was commenced
by public interest groups to challenge an agency‘s failure to
promulgate a rule. 606 F.2d 1031, 1046–47 (D.C. Cir. 1979). The
case was initially remanded back to the agency and district court
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to conduct further rulemaking procedures. It was not until those
procedures and proceedings were completed by the agency that
the public interest groups could seek judicial review of the
agency‘s final action. See Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. SEC, 389
F. Supp. 689, 702 (D.D.C 1974).
At a maximum, this court should remand CARE‘s claims to
the agency so all procedural requirements are exhausted under
RCRA sections 7004 or 3006. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6926, 6974. Before
making a determination that a state is no longer in compliance,
the Administrator must issue an order with a time and place for a
hearing, accompanied with the specific allegations of New Union‘s
noncompliance to be considered at the hearing. 40 C.F.R. § 271.23
(b)(1). Next, the state shall admit or deny the allegations put
forth in the order. Id. After an ―agency record‖ is compiled and
the presiding officer recommends a decision, then the
Administrator shall review the record and issue a decision. 40
C.F.R. § 271.23 (b)(8)(i). ―If the Administrator concludes that the
State has administered the program in conformity with the Act
and regulations his decision shall constitute a final agency action
within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. § 704.‖ 40 C.F.R. § 271.23 (b)(8)(ii)
(emphasis added).
In Ciba-Geigy, the court examined whether the petitioner
had exhausted all administrative remedies since ―it directly
related to the suitability of these matters for judicial review.‖
Ciba-Geigy Corporation v. Sidamon-Eristoff, 3 F.3d 40, 45 (2d
Cir. 1993) (quoting Dettmann v. United States Dep’t of Justice,
802 F.2d 1472, 1476 n. 8 (D.C. Cir. 1986)). First, the Second
Circuit found the relevant statute authorized the court of appeals
to review only the ―Administrator’s action. . .in issuing, denying,
modifying, or revoking any permit.‖ 42 U.S.C. § 6976(b)(1)
(emphasis added). Second, the court found that the EPA adopted
regulations that expressly created exhaustion requirements, for
instance requiring an appeal to the EAB as a prerequisite to
seeking judicial review of final agency action. Id. As the
petitioner had not exhausted all administrative remedies, judicial
review was not warranted.
Similarly, this matter is not ripe for judicial review because
CARE failed to exhaust all administrative remedies. Both the
instant case and Ciba-Geigy have the same statute at issue,
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RCRA section 7006. CARE argues that the court should lift the
stay and proceed with judicial review pursuant to this section.
However, RCRA section 7006 permits the court of appeals to
review only final agency action, such as a final order. There has
been no such order here.
The complex administrative remedy for non-compliance laid
out in the Code of Federal Regulations Section 271.23, governing
procedures for withdrawing approval of state programs,
demonstrates that there is no final agency action for CARE to
seek judicial review. Under this section, the administrator may
first order commencement of withdrawal proceedings on his or
her own initiative or in response to a petition. Then, after an
optional information investigation, the Administrator issues an
order to commence proceedings. ―This order commencing
proceedings under this paragraph shall fix a time and place for
the commencement of the hearing and shall specify the
allegations against the State which are to be considered at the
hearing.‖ 40 C.F.R. § 271.23(b)(1). Not only did the Administrator
not issue an order to trigger RCRA section 7006, the petitioners
did not exhaust all administrative remedies.
New Union has not received notice, has not received the
statutorily required process, no order has been issued, and New
Union has not been given an opportunity to come into compliance.
Either this court needs to accept the ―constructive determination‖
as non-reviewable action within the agency‘s discretion or
remand it back to EPA to exhaust the administrative remedies.
V. NEW UNION’S RCRA PROGRAM DOES NOT
MEET THE CRITERIA FOR THE DRASTIC
REMEDY OF WITHDRAWAL BECAUSE IT IS
COMPLIANT WITH FEDERAL REGULATIONS
AND ADEQUATELY ENFORCED.
If this court nonetheless decides that CARE‘s petition to
withdraw the New Union program is reviewable on the merits,
the court should not require withdrawal of the program
authorization. Withdrawal of a program‘s approval is an
―extreme‖ and ―drastic‖ remedy that requires EPA to establish a
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federal program to replace the state program. United States v.
Power Eng’g Co., 303 F.3d 1232, 1038–39 (10th Cir. 2002).1
CARE, as the party seeking withdrawal of the New Union
program‘s authorization, bears the burden of demonstrating that
New Union‘s program fails to comply with RCRA. 40 C.F.R. §
271.23(b)(1) (2010). EPA‘s complex regulatory scheme for
withdrawal mandates that CARE must prove New Union‘s
program is noncompliant with the federal requirements in either
its operation or its enforcement. 40 C.F.R. § 271.22(a)(2) and (3).
Even then, the language of Section 271.22 is permissive, allowing
EPA to use its best judgment as to whether withdrawal of a
state‘s program is proper and justified. See 40 C.F.R. §271.22(a)
(―[t]he Administrator may withdraw program approval when a
State program no longer complies‖) (emphasis added). CARE
cannot meet this burden for New Union‘s program because New
Union has not failed to operate or enforce its program despite the
temporary budget constraints. So long as New Union‘s program is
in compliance with the federal requirements, there is no basis for
EPA to withdraw its approval of the program‘s authorization.
A. New Union has not failed to issue permits or
otherwise exercise control over activities that are
required to be regulated.
A state program may face withdrawal if a state fails to
―exercise control over activities required to be regulated . . .
including failure to issue permits.‖ 40 C.F.R. §271.22(a)(2)(i). New
Union has not failed to exercise control over regulated activities
or issue permits as required. See 40 C.F.R. § 271.14; 40 C.F.R.
270 et. seq. (2010). New Union issued 125 state RCRA permits in
2009 and anticipates issuing another 125 throughout the course
of this year, more than enough to meet the demand of 50 annual
permit applications and address the ongoing backlog. (Rec. doc. 5
1. Indeed, EPA approval of an authorized state program like New Union‘s is
virtually never withdrawn. Out of the forty-six states that currently operate
authorized RCRA programs, the extreme remedy of withdrawal has only been
threatened in a single state, North Carolina. See William H. Rodgers,
Environmental Law: Hazardous Waste and Substances, 4 ENVTL. L. § 7:22
(2010); Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. Reilly, 938 F.3d 1390 (D.C. Cir.
1991).
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for 2009, p. 19). New Union is prioritizing its permit decisions in
order to maximize its control over potentially harmful hazardous
waste in a manner consistent with the RCRA‘s statutory scheme.
It is doing this in the following order of priority: new facilities,
facilities seeking to expand operations, facilities with permits
that expired more than 15 years ago, and facilities that have the
greatest potential for harm. Id. Continual permitting of facilities
hardly constitutes a failure.
Furthermore, the current pace of permitting in New Union
cannot be said to create a regulatory gap. Facilities with expired
permits still operate under the threat of permit revocation and
enforcement. Facilities are required to maintain and continue
current practices and comply with their expired RCRA permits,
which remain in force beyond the expiration date. 40 C.F.R. §
270.51(d). See Ciba-Geigy, 3 F.3d at 48. See also Wisconsin v.
Hydrite Chem. Co., 2000 WL 35624540 (Wis. App. Cir. 2000) (a
state court holding that a permit issued by the state RCRA
program remains in effect under 40 C.F.R. § 270.51(d) for an
unlimited period of time after expiration). Thus, New Union
retains sufficient control over regulated activities to meet the
requirements of the law.
B. New Union’s RCRA program is adequately enforced.
A program may also face withdrawal if it fails to enjoin
violations, sue for and recover civil penalties, enforce criminal
remedies, and ―immediately and effectively restrain‖ any person
―engaging in unauthorized activity‖ that is endangering the
public health. 40 C.F.R. § 271.16(a)(1) and (2) (2010). New Union
has not ―failed to act on violations of permits,‖ ―failed to seek
adequate enforcement penalties,‖ or ―failed to inspect and
monitor activities.‖ 40 C.F.R. § 271.22(a)(3)(i)–(iii). The New
Union DEP took six enforcement actions in 2009, including two
civil actions requesting injunctive relief and civil penalties. (Rec.
doc. 5 for 2009, p. 25).
The New Union program has shown itself capable of policing
the compliance of its permitees by implementing a program of
periodic inspection that is designed to ferret out and curtail the
most serious violations of permit requirements. Id. See also 40
C.F.R. § 271.15(b) (Requirements for compliance evaluation
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programs). The New Union DEP performed inspections of 150
facilities during 2009 and prioritized these inspections to ensure
that ―facilities that have reported unpermitted releases of
hazardous waste into the environment‖ and facilities ―posing the
greatest potential for harm to public health and the environment‖
are investigated and in compliance with the environmental laws.
(Rec. doc. 5 for 2009, p. 22). Furthermore, EPA is explicitly
authorized to retain the authority to enforce state permit
requirements (as it does in New Union) and support New Union‘s
enforcement scheme. 42 U.S.C. § 6928(a); 40 C.F.R. §§ 271.16,
271.19. New Union‘s program is not suffering from a failure in
enforcement.
EPA‘s original authorization of the New Union program
meant that the program met the statutory requirements of RCRA
as well as EPA‘s regulatory requirements for compliance and
approval. (Rec. doc. 2, p. 1). To the extent EPA‘s decision to
continue the New Union program is a ―constructive‖
determination that the program is in compliance, it affirms that
New Union continues to meet this statutory and regulatory
standard. New Union has continually provided EPA with honest
information in its Annual Reports, which allow EPA to make the
independent determination of whether the New Union program
meets the federal criteria. (Rec. doc. 5 for 2000–09). EPA, in
receipt of this information, has made the decision to continue to
approve the New Union program. The permissive regulatory
language means that EPA is allowed to decide if program
authorization should be continued for the New Union program,
and is not required to withdraw its authorization. This court
must defer to EPA‘s rational interpretation of its own regulatory
requirements and uphold the New Union program even if the
court disagrees with that interpretation. Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n v.
EPA, 919 F.2d 158,170 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
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VI. TRANSFERRING THE REGULATION OF A
SINGLE RAILROAD FROM THE NEW UNION
PROGRAM DOES NOT CREATE A REGULATORY
GAP THAT WOULD ALLOW EPA TO WITHDRAW
THE PROGRAM’S APPROVAL
The plain language and statutory history of RCRA make
clear that Congress intended for states (like New Union) to act as
the main authorities for RCRA implementation, with the federal
government in a supportive partnership role. See 42 U.S.C. §
6926. See also H.R. Rep. 1491, 94th Cong. 2nd Sess. 24 (1976)
(―[s]tates are to have primary enforcement authority‖ for RCRA).
CARE challenges this partnership with its claim that EPA is
required to withdraw its approval for the New Union program.
However, CARE‘s claim that EPA should withdraw New Union‘s
program due to the passage of the 2000 Environmental
Regulatory Adjustment Act represents a fundamental
misunderstanding of the role of the federal authorities in RCRA‘s
federal-state partnership scheme.
A. The New Union 2000 Environmental Regulatory
Adjustment Act amendment to the Railroad
Regulation Act does not create a regulatory gap in
the state program’s civil enforcement.
CARE alleges that the 2000 amendments to the Railroad
Regulation Act (―RRA Amendments‖), which transferred ―all
standard setting, permitting, inspection, and enforcement
authorities of the DEP under any and all state environmental
statutes to the [New Union Railroad] Commission,‖ should force
EPA to withdraw its approval of the New Union program because
it ―withdraws railroad hazardous waste facilities from
regulation.‖ (Rec. doc. 5 for 2000, pp. 103–05). However, New
Union has simply amended which oversight body would enforce
New Union‘s environmental laws, a move which does not create a
regulatory gap or leave railroad facilities outside the reach of
RCRA.
The RRA had previously established a New Union Railroad
Commission charged with regulating intrastate railroad freight
rates, railroad tracks and rights of way, and railroad yards. The
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2000 Amendments to the RRA clarify that oversight for railroad
operations is vested in the Commission, including enforcement of
the state environmental statutes. Id. This shift in jurisdictional
authority does not equate to non-enforcement of the state‘s
environmental laws. The Commission is a state agency, the
Commissioners are state employees, and the chair of the
Commission is appointed by the state legislature. Id. Thus, the
environmental enforcement remains under the oversight of a
state body. There is no requirement that any particular agency be
the enforcement body, and enforcement of the statutory scheme
by more than one state agency is contemplated by EPA. See 40
C.F.R. 271.6(b) (2010) (requiring a State to describe and chart the
―agency or agencies which will have responsibility for
administering the program‖) (emphasis added). Allowing for local
variance in the form of state enforcement is in keeping with
RCRA‘s overall goal of encouraging State-run programs and
maintaining state authority. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 6902, 6926.See also
H. R. Rep. 1491, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. 24.
However, even if the Commission fails to regulate, RCRA
Section 3008 grants EPA the authority to enforce the New Union
environmental program when the state fails to do so. 42 U.S.C. §
6928(a)(1). If the New Union Railroad Commission chooses not to
act, the EPA is not prohibited from bringing an independent
enforcement action. United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 660
F. Supp. 1236, 1245 (N.D. Ind. 1987). The majority of the courts
support the position that federal enforcement is permissible when
a state fails to enforce its program, even when the program is
operating under EPA authorization. See Wykcoff Co., 796 F.2d
1197, 1200 (9th Cir. 1986); Power Eng’r Co., 303 F.3d at 1238.
See also United States v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 143 F. Supp. 2d
1054 (W.D. Wis. 2001). The Eighth Circuit‘s limitation in Harmon
Indus. v. Browner is inapposite, as it relates to EPA‘s authority to
―overfile‖ when a state has already taken action. 191 F.3d 894,
901–02 (8th Cir. 1999). The legislative history of RCRA confirms
that Congress anticipated federal authorities enforcing state
programs if and when a state fails to do so. H.R. Rep. No. 941491, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. 31 (1976) (―[T]he Administrator is not
prohibited from acting in those cases where the state fails to
act‖). RCRA‘s federal-state partnership envisions this
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simultaneous enforcement authority, which does not create a
regulatory gap or a failure to implement New Union‘s
environmental laws.
B. The removal of state criminal enforcement for
violations by railroads does not render the program
inconsistent with federal law
Similarly, the removal of state criminal penalties under the
RRA Amendments does not subject the entirety of New Union‘s
program to withdrawal as inconsistent with the federal
requirement that the state ―shall have available‖ criminal
enforcement remedies or otherwise enforce its program. 40 C.F.R.
§§ 271.16, 271.22(a)(3). The RRA Amendments merely carve out a
narrow exception to New Union‘s criminal enforcement of its
environmental law by exempting a single railroad in the state.
(Rec. doc. 5 for 2000, pp. 103–05). The New Union DEP is in no
way constrained from pursuing criminal remedies against any
other facility within its jurisdiction. Id.
Despite this constraint on New Union‘s state criminal
enforcement, the RRA Amendments have no effect on the ability
of EPA to bring criminal sanctions for violations of the RCRA or
New Union‘s environmental laws. RCRA Section 3008 has been
interpreted to allow federal criminal prosecution for violations of
state permits even where the state is operating an approved
program in lieu of the federal program. 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d);
United States v. MacDonald & Watson Waste Oil Co., 933 F.2d
35, 43–45 (1st Cir. 1991) (state operation of a RCRA program
does not remove the federal government‘s ability to prosecute
under Section 3008 for violations of state law). See also Wykcoff
Co., 796 F.2d at 1200–01 (discussing the federal-state partnership
that allows for simultaneous federal enforcement of state law).
Thus there is no prohibition on prosecution, nor is a regulatory
gap created by the RRA Amendments. Concurrent federal law
serves to ensure that all potential remedies are available against
any violator of New Union‘s environmental law.
VII. THE NEW UNION 2000 ENVIRONMENTAL
REGULATORY ADJUSTMENT ACT’S
REGULATION OF POLLUTANT X DOES NOT
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RENDER THE NEW UNION PROGRAM SUBJECT
TO WITHDRAWAL AS INCONSISTENT WITH
RCRA OR IN VIOLATION OF THE COMMERCE
CLAUSE.
It is established under RCRA that states are free to
implement environmental protections that are more stringent
than the Federal standard. 42 U.S.C. § 6929. See also Blue Circle
Cement, Inc. v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 27 F.3d 1499, 1504 (10th
Cir. 1994). When it drafted RCRA, Congress explicitly intended
not to foreclose state and local oversight of hazardous waste
management that would be more stringent than the federal
―floor.‖ Old Bridge Chems., Inc. v. New Jersey Dep’t of Envtl.
Prot., 965 F.2d 1287, 1292 (3d Cir. 1992). State programs are only
subject to the condition that they be ―consistent‖ with the federal
program. 42 U.S.C. § 6929. ―Consistency‖ is defined by regulation
in Section 271.4, which states:
To obtain approval, a State program must be consistent with the
Federal program . . .
a) Any aspect of the State program which unreasonably
restricts, impedes, or operates as a ban on the free movement
across the State border of hazardous wastes from or to other
states for treatment, storage, or disposal at facilities
authorized to operate under the Federal or approved State
program shall be deemed inconsistent.
b) Any aspect of State law or of the State program which has no
basis in human health or environmental protection and
which acts as a prohibition on the treatment, storage or
disposal of hazardous waste in the State may be deemed
inconsistent.

40 C.F.R. § 271.4 (2010). New Union‘s regulation of Pollutant X is
consistent with this regulation, and is therefore, by definition,
consistent with the Federal program.
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A. New Union’s regulation of Pollutant X does not
operate as a ban on the free movement of hazardous
wastes across the state border that would require
EPA to withdraw its approval.
New Union‘s regulation of Pollutant X provides, ―[a]ny person
may transport Pollutant X through or out of the state . . .
provided, however, that such transport shall be as direct and fast
as is reasonably possible . . .‖ (Rec. doc. 5 for 2000, pp. 105–07).
The New Union Hazardous Regulation Act can best be described
as a limitation upon the manner in which Pollutant X can be
transported through the State. See, e.g., Old Bridge Chems., 965
F.2d at 1296 (upholding a New Jersey law that required
transporters to label and identify hazardous waste).
The New Union legislature has made a conscientious
determination of how to best balance the needs of the interstate
commerce system with the strong state interest in protecting the
health and welfare of the citizens of the state and the New Union
environment against a pollutant that has been determined to be
among the most potent and toxic to human and environmental
health. See Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 150–51 (1986). Any
person is free to transport Pollutant X across the open state line.
The only requirement is that they do so reasonably quickly. A
statute which gives persons permission to transport Pollutant X
through the state of New Union can hardly be construed as a
―ban‖ or an ―unreasonable impediment‖ on the free flow of
transport within the state. Therefore there is no basis for EPA‘s
mandatory withdrawal of the New Union program‘s approval
under Section 271.4(a).
B. New Union’s regulation of Pollutant X has a basis in
the protection of human health and does not act as
a prohibition on the treatment, storage, or disposal
of hazardous waste that would allow for EPA to
withdraw its approval.
Under the second regulatory prong, Section 271.4(b),
withdrawal of program approval is discretionary with EPA. This
means that even if the challenged state regulation is not based in
the protection of human health and the environment and acts as
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a prohibition on the treatment, storage, or disposal of hazardous
waste in the state, EPA is not required to take the drastic step of
withdrawing a state program‘s approval. Id.
Furthermore, the regulation‘s two prong test is conjunctive,
which means that if the State regulation is either based in a valid
protection of human or environmental health or if the state
regulation does not constitute a total ban on hazardous waste
treatment, disposal, or storage, EPA may not withdraw its
program approval on the basis of inconsistency under Section
271.4(b). Id. See also Blue Circle Cement, 27 F.3d at 1508 (―An
ordinance which falls short of a total ban on encouraged activity
will ordinarily be upheld so long as it is supported by a record
establishing that it is a reasonable response to a legitimate local
concern for safety or welfare.‖); Hazardous Waste Treatment
Council v. Reilly, 938 F.3d at 1397 (upholding North Carolina‘s
dilution standard and site-selection criteria when these laws did
not effectuate a ―total ban‖ on a certain treatment method within
the state).
The New Union Act does not effectuate a ―total ban‖ or
―prohibition‖ on ―the treatment, storage, or disposal of hazardous
waste‖ in the state. New Union allows short-term temporary
storage of Pollutant X within the state. (Rec. doc. 5 for 2000, pp.
105–07). Furthermore, the restrictions in the Hazardous
Regulation Act restrict only Pollutant X, and do not constitute a
ban on the disposal or treatment of ―hazardous waste‖ as a whole.
Id.
Finally, the restrictions on Pollutant X are supported by a
record that establishes the legislation was based on legitimate
concerns about human health and the environment. The
Preamble to the legislation lays out the Legislature‘s findings
that Pollutant X is among the most potent and toxic chemicals to
human health and the environment as a basis for the regulation.
Id. A state statute that does not effectuate a total ban on RCRAencouraged activities, is based in a concern for human health,
and is consistent with the goals of RCRA is exactly the sort of
permissible more-stringent regulation that is encouraged by
RCRA approval of State programs. See 42 U.S.C. § 6926.
C. New Union’s regulation of Pollutant X does not
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violate the Commerce Clause
Finally, CARE alleges that the New Union program should
be withdrawn because the regulation of Pollutant X violates the
dormant aspect of the Commerce Clause of the United States
Constitution. U.S. CONST. Art. I, §8, cl. 3. It is true that courts
have held RCRA‘s regulations do not preempt the dormant
Commerce Clause‘s restrictions on states‘ ability to regulate and
have indicated that the Commerce Clause may be more stringent
than regulations such as Section 271.4. See Envtl. Tech. Council
v. Sierra Club, 98 F.3d 774 (4th Cir. 1996). However, New
Union‘s regulation of Pollutant X does not violate the dormant
aspect of the Commerce Clause and does not provide a basis for
EPA to withdraw the New Union program‘s approval.
The Supreme Court has refined its Commerce Clause
jurisprudence in the area of waste disposal and regulation. See
United Haulers Assoc., Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste
Mgmt Auth., 550 U.S. 330 (2007) (holding a ―flow control‖
ordinance which directed all trash haulers to deliver waste to a
particular public facility was not an impermissible violation of the
dormant Commerce Clause when it did not facially discriminate
between in-state and out-of-state waste and the burdens on
Commerce were outweighed by the public benefits). But see C & A
Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383 (1994). From
this line of cases a fairly clear test has emerged. A state statute
or local regulation is ―virtually per se‖ invalid and subject to strict
scrutiny under the Commerce Clause when it facially
discriminates against interstate Commerce by burdening out-ofstate waste generators differently than those in the state. Oregon
Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality of the State of Oregon,
511 U.S. 93, 100–01 (1994). See also Chem. Waste Mgmt., Inc. v.
Hunt, 504 U.S. 334 (1992) (invalidating an Alabama statute that
charged a fee for the disposal of hazardous waste generated outof-state). In contrast, non-discriminatory regulations that have
only incidental effects on interstate commerce are valid unless
―the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in
relation to the putative local benefits.‖ Oregon Waste Sys., Inc.,
511 U.S. at 99 (citing Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137,
142 (1970)).

31

06

4/24/2011 2:32 AM

Intervenor

2011]

BEST BRIEF: INTERVENORS

191

The New Union Hazardous Regulation Act is not facially
discriminatory against interstate commerce. There is no fee
charged to enter the state or cross state lines while transporting
Pollutant X, and no distinction drawn between in-state and outof-state producers of Pollutant X for purposes of enforcing the
regulation. (Rec. doc. 5 for 2000, pp. 105–07). In-state producers
of Pollutant X, regulated by New Union‘s DEP, are required to
minimize and eventually cease its production—a regulation
which does nothing to discriminate against out-of-state
production. (ERAA Amd. 1, id.). Both in-state and out-of-state
generators are required to dispose of their quantity of Pollutant X
at an approved facility which, since New Union has no such
facility, will naturally be a facility out-of-state. (ERAA Amd. 2,
id.). Nothing in the statute or its legislative history gives any
indication the statute was motivated by a desire to impose an
impermissible burden on interstate commerce or to discriminate
against out-of-state generators of Pollutant X.
Thus, the New Union statute retains its presumption of
validity and should be evaluated under the Pike test. Oregon
Waste Sys., Inc., 511 U.S. at 99. Under the Pike test, state and
local ordinances should be upheld when the incidental burden on
commerce does not outweigh the benefits conferred to the
citizenry. Id. See also Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt Auth.,
550 U.S. at 334. There are two potential incidental effects on
interstate commerce from New Union‘s regulation of Pollutant X:
first, out of state producers may be lightly burdened by the
requirement to transport Pollutant X as directly and quickly as
possible out of New Union, and second, certain companies who
wish to open facilities to treat and dispose of Pollutant X from
either in-state or out-of-state producers may be unable to do so.
(Rec. doc. 5 for 2000, pp. 105-107). These concerns are easily
outweighed by the state‘s strong interest in protecting its
citizenry from one of the most potent and toxic chemicals to
public health and the environment. Protection of public health
from an immediate and severe threat is a strong enough state
interest to allow even facially discriminatory legislation to stand.
See Maine, 477 U.S. at 151. Non-discriminatory legislation such
as the New Union Hazardous Regulation Act should be upheld.
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There is no basis for EPA to withdraw New Union‘s program.
It is adequately enforced, consistent with federal requirements,
and compliant with both EPA‘s regulations and the dictates of the
Commerce Clause. EPA and New Union should be permitted to
continue to work together to achieve RCRA‘s overarching goal of
federal and state cooperation to minimize hazardous waste and
protect human health and the environment.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this court should find for the State
of New Union on any of the following three grounds: (1) this court
lacks jurisdiction over the present dispute, (2) EPA‘s failure to act
on CARE‘s petition is not a ―constructive denial‖ of that petition,
or (3) New Union‘s hazardous waste program continues to meet
RCRA‘s criteria for state program approval.
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